{"id":15062,"date":"2022-04-05T12:14:28","date_gmt":"2022-04-05T11:14:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/gnhre.org\/?p=15062"},"modified":"2023-08-15T19:46:35","modified_gmt":"2023-08-15T18:46:35","slug":"legal-standards-for-judging-states-mitigation-efforts","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/gnhre.org\/?p=15062","title":{"rendered":"Legal standards for judging States\u2019 mitigation efforts"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>by <a href=\"https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/in\/lucy-maxwell-ba743898\/\">Lucy Maxwell<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/in\/sarah-mead-330142110\/?originalSubdomain=nl\">Sarah Mead<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/in\/dennisvberkel\/\">Dennis van Berkel<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Climate litigation occurs against a backdrop of climate crisis and government inaction. As this&nbsp;<a rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/gnhre.org\/community\/gnhre-blog-post-series-rights-based-climate-change-litigation-global-and-regional-perspectives\/\" target=\"_blank\">GNHRE blog post series<\/a>&nbsp;explains, communities are increasingly turning to the courts as a last resort to compel high-emitting countries to ramp up their mitigation ambition.&nbsp;Following the landmark <a href=\"http:\/\/climatecasechart.com\/climate-change-litigation\/non-us-case\/urgenda-foundation-v-kingdom-of-the-netherlands\/\">Urgenda case<\/a> in the Netherlands, these \u2018systemic mitigation\u2019 lawsuits \u2013 which seek to compel a State to increase its overall mitigation efforts \u2013 have spread to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.urgenda.nl\/en\/themas\/climate-case\/global-climate-litigation\/\">every corner<\/a> of the world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Several judgments of national courts have led to significant increases in governments\u2019 efforts to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, including in <a href=\"http:\/\/climatecasechart.com\/climate-change-litigation\/non-us-case\/notre-affaire-a-tous-and-others-v-france\/\">France<\/a>, <a href=\"http:\/\/climatecasechart.com\/climate-change-litigation\/non-us-case\/friends-of-the-irish-environment-v-ireland\/\">Ireland<\/a> and <a href=\"http:\/\/climatecasechart.com\/climate-change-litigation\/non-us-case\/neubauer-et-al-v-germany\/\">Germany<\/a>. Such cases have huge potential to close the yawning <a href=\"https:\/\/www.unep.org\/resources\/emissions-gap-report-2021\">\u2018emissions gap\u2019<\/a> and hold global average temperature increase below the danger line of 1.5\u00b0C above pre-industrial levels.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Yet, these cases can pose challenges for judges, with some national courts expressing concern about a perceived lack of standards against which to assess the legality of a State\u2019s mitigation efforts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In response to these concerns, we have set out the lessons that can (and should) be taken from recent cases in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.elgaronline.com\/view\/journals\/jhre\/aop\/jhre.2022.0003\/jhre.2022.0003.xml?rskey=svGS2g&amp;result=1\">this article<\/a> of the Special Issue. Specifically, we identify a set of standards for judging a State\u2019s mitigation efforts, drawing on international environmental law, best available science and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.tandfonline.com\/doi\/full\/10.1080\/14693062.2021.1970504\">recent advancements<\/a> in quantifying a country\u2019s \u2018fair share\u2019 of emission reductions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>We indicate how national courts have used these standards in cases to date, and identify future directions for the adjudication of systemic mitigation cases. While the legal contexts of climate cases differ, we believe that these standards can be applied across jurisdictions, including those in which climate litigation has thus far been less successful.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Most systemic mitigation cases are premised on a State\u2019s obligations under human rights law or tort law (but may also be based on public law). These cases utilise well-established rules which oblige a State (or its organs) to adopt \u2018reasonable\u2019 measures to prevent or minimise a foreseeable and serious risk of harm to persons or things within its jurisdiction. As a general rule, the test for breach of this obligation is whether the State has met a minimum standard of reasonableness in devising its response to the risk of harm.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The question is: how does this legal obligation apply in the context of climate change?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Judgments rendered in systemic mitigation cases thus far show two key developments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>First, most courts have recognised the <strong>justiciability<\/strong> of systemic mitigation cases \u2013 an important threshold issue. This includes the courts in the cases mentioned above, as well as in <a href=\"http:\/\/climatecasechart.com\/climate-change-litigation\/non-us-case\/vzw-klimaatzaak-v-kingdom-of-belgium-et-al\/\">Belgium<\/a>, <a href=\"http:\/\/climatecasechart.com\/climate-change-litigation\/non-us-case\/mathur-et-al-v-her-majesty-the-queen-in-right-of-ontario\/\">Canada<\/a>, <a href=\"http:\/\/climatecasechart.com\/climate-change-litigation\/non-us-case\/future-generation-v-ministry-environment-others\/\">Colombia<\/a>, and <a href=\"http:\/\/climatecasechart.com\/climate-change-litigation\/non-us-case\/shrestha-v-office-of-the-prime-minister-et-al\/\">Nepal<\/a>. Some unsuccessful cases in North America (see e.g. <a href=\"http:\/\/climatecasechart.com\/climate-change-litigation\/case\/juliana-v-united-states\/\">here<\/a> and <a href=\"http:\/\/climatecasechart.com\/climate-change-litigation\/non-us-case\/environnement-jeunesse-v-canadian-government\/\">here<\/a>) are an anomaly in this respect. &nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Secondly, many courts have recognised that the State has a <strong>legal duty<\/strong> under existing human rights and\/or tort law to undertake mitigation efforts (through GHG emissions reduction) in light of the current and projected harm caused by climate change. Crucially, these judgments establish that the State\u2019s duty exists <em>notwithstanding<\/em> that climate change is a global problem, which cannot be solved by any individual country. This includes decisions of courts in the Netherlands, Germany, France, Belgium, Nepal and Colombia, in the cases referred to above.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Dutch Supreme Court in <a href=\"http:\/\/climatecasechart.com\/climate-change-litigation\/non-us-case\/urgenda-foundation-v-kingdom-of-the-netherlands\/\"><em>Urgenda v. the Netherlands<\/em><\/a>,for instance, determined that the State must do \u201cits part\u201d in order to prevent dangerous climate change, and expressly rejected the State\u2019s defence that its emissions were negligible in absolute terms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Fewer courts, however, have proceeded to assess whether a State\u2019s overall mitigation efforts are sufficient to discharge its legal obligations. In most instances, courts have upheld the plaintiffs\u2019 claims on grounds that do not require an assessment of the reasonableness of the State\u2019s efforts, or have determined that a State has such a wide margin of discretion in this context that the alleged violation of obligations in human rights law or tort law is unfounded.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Nevertheless, lessons for future cases can be drawn from decisions of courts that<em> have<\/em> taken this step, including the judgments from the Netherlands in <em>Urgenda <\/em>and Germany in <a href=\"http:\/\/climatecasechart.com\/climate-change-litigation\/non-us-case\/neubauer-et-al-v-germany\/\"><em>Neubauer et al v. Germany<\/em><\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>These judgments show that courts can identify concrete standards against which to assess States\u2019 mitigation efforts when existing duties in human rights law and\/or tort law are interpreted in light of international law and best available science. What follows is a summary of these standards, each of which is expanded upon in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.elgaronline.com\/view\/journals\/jhre\/aop\/jhre.2022.0003\/jhre.2022.0003.xml?rskey=svGS2g&amp;result=1\">our article<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\"><p>In order to discharge its legal obligations to take reasonable measures to protect persons or things within its jurisdiction from the foreseeable and severe harm posed by climate change, a State<strong> <\/strong>must adopt<strong> <\/strong>measures to mitigate climate change by reducing its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.<br \/><br \/>Such mitigation measures should:<br \/>(a) be based on a long-term temperature goal of at least 1.5\u00b0C;<br \/>(b) be informed by the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities, on the basis of which each country needs to do its \u2018fair share\u2019 as informed by best available science;<strong><br \/><\/strong>(c) include a date by which to achieve carbon neutrality, which for developed countries should be well before 2050;<br \/>(d) be internally consistent (that is, short-term mitigation measures should be scientifically consistent with long-term mitigation measures);<br \/>(e) represent a \u2018progression over time\u2019, with regular increases in ambition;<br \/>(f) not rely excessively on negative emissions technology; and<br \/>(g) be sufficiently detailed to indicate how emissions reductions will be achieved.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>National courts have already recognised that these indicators provide a basis against which to assess the reasonableness of a State\u2019s measures, as we outline in our article.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>For example, several national courts have recognised that mitigation measures should be premised on a <strong>long-term temperature goal of 1.5\u00b0C<\/strong>, including in <a href=\"http:\/\/climatecasechart.com\/climate-change-litigation\/non-us-case\/milieudefensie-et-al-v-royal-dutch-shell-plc\/\"><em>Milieudefensie v Royal Dutch Shell<\/em><\/a><em> <\/em>(2021), <a href=\"http:\/\/climatecasechart.com\/climate-change-litigation\/non-us-case\/friends-of-the-irish-environment-v-ireland\/\"><em>Friends of the Irish Environment v Ireland<\/em><\/a> (2020) and <em>Urgenda v. Netherlands <\/em>(2019). States themselves recently reaffirmed that 1.5\u00b0C is the danger line in the <a href=\"https:\/\/unfccc.int\/documents\/310475\">Glasgow Climate Pact<\/a>, which was unanimously adopted during COP26 in November 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>National courts have also increasingly engaged with standards for assessing a country\u2019s <strong>\u2018fair share\u2019<\/strong> of the global emissions reduction burden \u2013 an issue at the centre of systemic mitigation cases. The <em>Urgenda <\/em>case represented the first time that a court tackled this question. The Supreme Court of the Netherlands highlighted that the Dutch State had committed, as a developed country party to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, to \u2018take the lead\u2019 in emissions reduction, and to do so in line with the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR-RC). <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To ascertain what this obligation meant in practice, the Supreme Court drew on findings in the IPCC\u2019s Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), which concluded that developed countries needed to reduce their emissions within a <em>range <\/em>of between 25 to 40% by 2020 compared to 1990 levels. The court accepted <a href=\"https:\/\/www.urgenda.nl\/wp-content\/uploads\/Advisory-opinion-on-Cassation-ECLI_NL_PHR_2019_1026.pdf\">the opinion<\/a> of its independent legal advisors that \u2013 while this finding was not binding on the court as such and didn\u2019t provide \u201ccut and dried answers\u201d to the question of \u2018fair share\u2019 \u2013 it was a \u201creasoned proposal\u201d. The emissions reduction range was derived from the latest scientific studies and covered a broad spectrum of effort-sharing methodologies, and could therefore be taken as a starting point for specifying the duty of care of the Dutch State.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The German Constitutional Court in <em>Neubauer <\/em>took a similar approach. While acknowledging that there existed various methods for determining a State\u2019s necessary emissions reductions (all of which entailed uncertainties), the Court found that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u201c\u2026 this does not make it permissible under constitutional law for Germany\u2019s required contribution to be chosen arbitrarily. Nor can a specific constitutional obligation to reduce CO<sub>2<\/sub> emissions be invalidated by simply arguing that Germany\u2019s share of the reduction burden and of the global CO<sub>2 <\/sub>budget are impossible to determine.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>We see a similar approach in the <a href=\"http:\/\/climatecasechart.com\/climate-change-litigation\/non-us-case\/milieudefensie-et-al-v-royal-dutch-shell-plc\/\"><em>Shell <\/em>decision<\/a> of the Hague District Court, concerning a company\u2019s climate mitigation obligations pursuant to tort law. The court accepted that while \u201cno one single [reduction] pathway is the measure of all things on a global scale\u201d, there nevertheless exists \u201cwidely endorsed consensus\u201d regarding the minimum emissions reductions that are required to avert dangerous climate change.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>These decisions show that, notwithstanding the absence of \u2018hard\u2019 answers, it is possible for courts to determine whether a State\u2019s mitigation efforts fall outside of the range of its minimum \u2018fair share\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Going forward, there is a robust body of \u2018effort sharing\u2019 literature that courts can draw upon to assess this question of \u2018fair share\u2019. This literature, which was similarly relied on by the IPCC in AR4, uses scientific methodologies to divide the remaining emissions \u2018space\u2019 or budget between countries. A prominent publication by <a href=\"https:\/\/www.tandfonline.com\/doi\/full\/10.1080\/14693062.2021.1970504\">Rajamani et. al<\/a>. applies these methodologies in light of principles of international law, making it especially important for climate litigation. The study concludes that in order for developed counties to contribute to the global effort of emissions reduction, in line with international law and in particular the principles of equity and CBDR-RC, they must reduce their emissions to net-zero (and some become net-negative) by around 2030.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Even if courts are not willing to engage with this literature, there are still standards that they can use to assess States\u2019 mitigation efforts in light of their legal obligations. At the most basic level, courts can consider the \u2018global average\u2019 of emissions reductions required to hold global temperature to 1.5\u00b0C. All States have accepted that developed counties need to \u2018take the lead\u2019 in reducing emissions (e.g. UNFCCC, Arts 3.1 and 4.2). Developed countries should, therefore, <em>at the very least<\/em> reduce GHG emissions at a greater rate than the \u2018global average\u2019 reduction rate for limiting global warming to 1.5\u2103 (which is a reduction of 45% by 2030 relative to 2010 levels, as recognised by States in the Glasgow Climate Pact). &nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The climate crisis poses unprecedented challenges for humanity. The law will increasingly be called upon to hold governments (and corporations) accountable for their contribution to dangerous climate change. It is crucially important that litigators and courts use the tools at their disposal, including those provided by law and science, to scrutinise States\u2019 mitigation efforts to ensure that they provide a real chance of holding global average temperatures below 1.5\u00b0C.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>by Lucy Maxwell, Sarah Mead and Dennis van Berkel Climate litigation occurs against a backdrop of climate crisis and government inaction. As this&nbsp;GNHRE blog post series&nbsp;explains, communities are increasingly turning to the courts as a last resort to compel high-emitting countries to ramp up their mitigation ambition.&nbsp;Following the landmark Urgenda case in the Netherlands, these [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":83,"featured_media":15063,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"wp-custom-template-posts","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[420],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-15062","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-community"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/gnhre.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15062","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/gnhre.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/gnhre.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/gnhre.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/83"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/gnhre.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=15062"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/gnhre.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15062\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":15070,"href":"https:\/\/gnhre.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15062\/revisions\/15070"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/gnhre.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/15063"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/gnhre.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=15062"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/gnhre.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=15062"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/gnhre.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=15062"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}